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Abstract 
Asset securitization offers banks the possibility of altering their capital structures and the financial 
intermediation process. This study shows that the introduction of securitization is associated with 
fundamental changes in the funding policies of banks. In particular, we present evidence of more 
intense use of securitization by banks (i) with stronger growth opportunities; (ii) with liquidity 
constraints; (iii) with costlier alternative sources of funding; and (iv) with restricted access to capital 
markets owing to adverse selection. Securitization is also observed to be higher on the pecking 
order of financing choices of small and medium-sized banks and non-listed banks, which are likely 
to face more severe adverse selection problems. 
Keywords: securitization, capital structure, adverse selection, pecking order. 
JEL Classification: G32, G21. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
La titulización de activos ofrece a los bancos la posibilidad de alterar su estructura de capital y el 
proceso de intermediación financiera. Este trabajo muestra que la introducción de la titulización 
está asociada con cambios fundamentales en la política de captación de fondos de los bancos. 
En particular, presentamos evidencia de un uso más intenso de la titulización por parte de los 
bancos i) con mayores oportunidades de crecimiento, ii) con restricciones de liquidez, iii) con 
alternativas más costosas de financiación, y iv) con restricciones de acceso al mercado de 
capital debido a la selección adversa. Se observa también en este trabajo que la titulización 
ocupa un lugar importante en el orden de prelación en la elección de fuentes de financiación de 
los bancos medianos y pequeños y de los no cotizados, que son los que probablemente tienen 
problemas de selección adversa más severos. 
Palabras clave: titulización, estructura de capital, selección adversa, orden de prelación en la 
financiación. 
Códigos JEL: G32, G21. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 7 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1506 
1 Introduction 
How does the introduction of securitization affect banks’ operations and financing choices? 
Asset securitization expands the financing possibilities of banks by allowing the transformation 
of illiquid assets on bank balance sheets, e.g., mortgage loans, into marketable securities. 
Banks can use this financial innovation to fund asset growth and also to alter their capital 
structures, with securitizations substituting for more traditional liabilities such as bank 
deposits. Indeed, securitization is a financial innovation that fundamentally affects the financial 
intermediation process performed by banks and is reflected on the asset and liability sides of 
banks’ balance sheets. 
The financial literature has studied some determinants of the expansion of 
securitization, such as the corporate-taxation advantages in Pennacchi et al. (2014), and has 
also examined its effects on banks’ operations, credit standards and credit expansion, e.g., 
Loutskina and Strahan (2009) and Loutskina (2011).1
Using data from the Spanish banking system during the period 1988-2006 we 
empirically examine a series of hypothesis on the effects that securitization may have 
produced on banks’ capital structures. We motivate these hypotheses with insights from 
traditional theories of capital structures in corporate finance; namely the trade-off and the 
pecking order theories, (Myers 1984, and Myers and Majluf 1984). In particular, as suggested 
by the trade-off theory we assume that there is an optimal capital structure for each bank, 
which is potentially affected when access to a new financing possibility (securitization of 
assets in our case) becomes available. Based on this simple insight, we test hypotheses that 
consider whether securitization will be used more intensively by (i) those banks with more 
profitable uses for new funds and (ii) those banks for which access to other financing sources 
was restricted or particularly costly. Furthermore, motivated by the logic of the pecking order 
theory we examine the position securitization takes in the pecking order of bank financing 
choices and relate that to the adverse selection effects that banks may experience when 
issue securities.  
 However, the literature has not studied 
in detail how securitization changes the financing choices and capital structure of banks, 
which is the focus of this paper. 
The Spanish banking system provides an ideal framework for studying securitization 
as a shock on the availability of bank financing alternatives for several reasons. While in other 
countries, such as the United States, securitization developed progressively beginning in the 
early eighties; in Spain the process can be better described as a regime shift. Only after 
several legal changes that occurred in 1998 could banks effectively consider securitizing their 
assets.2 The sample period ends in 2006, just before the financial crisis has removed loan 
securitization as a funding possibility for banks.3
                                                                            
1. See also Keys et al. (2010), Purnanandam (2011), and Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011), who provide evidence on 
the relation between deterioration of loan quality and securitization. Other relevant references on this topic include Pais 
Rodriguez (2005, 2009), Mian and Sufi (2009) and Jiménez et al (2010). There is also evidence that securitization does 
not necessarily worsen adverse selection problems, as shown by Benmelech et al. (2012) for the securitization of 
corporate loans. 
 In addition, securitization was promptly 
embraced by Spanish banks which, on average, proceeded to securitize a substantial part of 
2. The securitization period began in 1999, when the euro was adopted, facilitating firms’ access to European capital 
markets. Bris, Koskinen and Nilsson (2009) show a reduction of firms’ cost of capital after 1999. 
3. Since mid-2007, Spanish banks have only carried out securitization operations to obtain liquidity from the ECB. 
Private investors have refused to participate with new funds in this securitization market. 
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their assets (e.g., more than 25% of their mortgages).4
Our study is organized into three main parts. In the first part, we provide a 
descriptive analysis of (i) the differences between the capital structure of Spanish banks 
before 1999 and at the end of 2006, (ii) the relation of securitization with the decoupling of 
lending and deposit activities of banks, and (iii) the changes in banks’ funding policies and 
the role of securitization as a source of funds.
 Finally, the Spanish banking system 
includes entities of different characteristics in terms of their access to finance, which provides 
a useful source of exogenous variation for our tests. In particular, this heterogeneity provides 
a useful framework to study the extent to which securitization might overcome adverse 
selection in capital markets.   
5
The second part of this study examines the determinants of securitization. Motivated 
by our premise that securitization affects the optimal mix of financing sources, we examine 
whether securitization is used more intensively by those banks with higher growth 
opportunities, higher financial costs of alternative sources of funds and lower costs of 
securitization. We consider several aspects of the securitization process including whether or 
not banks used securitization, but also the loan amounts securitized and time until the first 
use of securitization.  
 We examine in particular the different roles 
of deposits in the Spanish credit expansions of 1988-1991 (pre-securitization period) and 
1998-2006 (post-securitization period). 
In the third part we examine how securitization fits in the pecking order of financing 
choices by banks. As bank balance sheets are opaque (Morgan, 2002), adverse selection can 
impose greater discounts on the debt and equity issuances of banks than on financial securities 
issued by nonfinancial firms. Furthermore, the sale of individual bank loans and pools of assets 
(with no tranching)6 can also be subject to large discounts, because banks have private 
information7 on borrowers’ conditions (DeMarzo, 2005; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999). In this 
context, banks might raise new funds at a lower cost through securitization because the 
process of pooling and tranching loans has the potential to reduce informational asymmetries 
(DeMarzo, 2005). To examine the securitization decision we modify the pecking order equation8
There are a number of findings that emerge from our analysis. First, loan 
securitization is associated with substantial changes in the liability structure of banks. In 
particular, the use of securitization is associated with lower reliance on deposits to finance the 
 
in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) and explore whether banks are 
likely to first choose securitization over other sources of funds and if this effect is more 
pronounced when they face more severe adverse selection problems (Bharath et al., 2009). 
                                                                            
4. During the study period Spanish banks became the second largest issuers in Europe of ABS (after British banks) and 
of covered bonds (after German banks).  
5. From 2005 onwards, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) forced Spanish banks to keep in their balance 
sheets securitized loans unless a substantial part of the risk and profits of these securitizations had been transferred. In 
practice, banks held more than 90% of their securitized loans on their balance sheets. We keep track of all the 
securitized loans. In order to homogenize the data and facilitate comparisons, we add back into bank balance sheets 
any securitized loan pool that was off-balance-sheet during the sample period. 
6. See the seminal article by Pennacchi (1988) on the process of selling loans and its associated risks. Drucker and Puri 
(2009) document substantial growth in the U.S. secondary loan market in spite of informational problems (a growth rate 
of 25% from 1991 to 2006 has led to a market size of $236.6 billion in 2006).  
7. Adverse selection can be reduced by the presence of implicit agreements, as in Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), and 
restrictive covenants, as in Drucker and Puri (2009). In collateralized loan obligations (CLO), adverse selection can be 
reduced because securitized loans are fractions of syndicated loans, and reputation as well as the stake of lead’s bank, 
reduce information asymmetries (Benmelech et al., 2012). 
8. Frank and Goyal (2008) provide a survey of the literature of the pecking order theory. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1506 
expansion of bank credit. These changes in the liability structure are more apparent for banks 
that face severe adverse selection problems and have restricted access to financial markets. 
Second, securitization is used more frequently by banks with stronger growth opportunities, 
higher relative cost of financing alternatives and tighter liquidity constraints. Bank size is 
positively associated with securitization, but large banks also make above-average use of 
equity and debt financing. In relative terms, securitization represents a higher proportion of 
external funds for smaller and medium-size banks. Securitization also tends to be higher in 
the pecking order of financing choices of small- and medium-size banks and non-listed 
banks, which are likely to face more severe adverse selection problems. 
The existing literature on bank capital structure generally considers theoretical 
frameworks focused on the combination of lending and deposit activities.9
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the characteristics of 
the data used. Section 3 describes the effects of the introduction of securitization on banks’ 
capital structures. Section 4 analyzes banks’ securitization decisions with regression models. 
Section 5 examines the position of securitization in the hierarchy of financing sources of 
banks. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 In this traditional 
banking setting, earlier articles have studied the impact of market conditions and asymmetric 
information on the optimal financial structure of banks, e. g., Gatev et al. (2009), Gatev and 
Strahan (2006), Diamond and Rajan (2001), Flannery (1994) and Calomiris and Kahn (1991). 
By contrast, this study focuses on a banking setting in which securitization is a relevant 
source of funds and new loans can be financed without the need of bank deposits, as found 
in Loutskina (2011). For this alternative banking model, we analyze how securitization affects 
the optimal asset composition and capital structure of banks. This analysis contributes to the 
literature exploring how securitization has changed traditional banking, e. g., Mian and Sufi 
(2009), Loutskina and Strahan (2009), Parlour and Plantin (2008) and Greenbaum (1987). Our 
work is also related to Cornett et al. (2011), who find a negative relation during the recent 
financial crisis between securitization and both bank holdings of liquid assets and bank 
lending. We find that securitizing banks expanded loans and reduced holdings of liquid assets 
more aggressively than other banks during the financial boom, indicating that the results in 
Cornett et al. (2011) are not only specific to the financial crisis. 
                                                                            
9. Strahan (2008) provides a summary of the different banking theories that explain the rationale for the combination of 
lending and deposit activities inside the banking firm. 
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2 Data and Sample Characteristics 
We collect data on securitized loan issuances of Spanish banks from 1999 to 2006, covering a 
period of active participation of Spanish banks in securitization activities. Before 1999, financial 
regulation limited the possibilities of Spanish banks to use loan securitizations. After 2006, the 
lack of liquidity in securitization markets prevented new issuances of securitized loans. 
We use the term “bank” to refer to all forms of depository institutions, including (i) 
commercial banks, (ii) savings banks (i.e., “cajas”) and (iii) credit cooperatives. Banks differ in 
their ownership structure, governance and organizational purpose. Commercial banks are for-
profit corporations owned by their shareholders. Savings banks are nonprofit organizations 
controlled by local and regional governments. Credit cooperatives are entities owned by a 
fraction of their depositors and have as their main objective to provide credit to them. 
Historically, (i.e., before 1999) commercial banks raised external funds through different 
sources (i.e., issuance of equity and debt securities), rather than being restricted to use only 
bank deposits while, by contrast, savings banks and credit cooperatives were mostly limited 
to funding through bank deposits.  
Our sample consists of the population of Spanish banks, which ranges from 212 
banks in 1999 to 179 entities in 2006.10 In 1999 (2006), the sample includes 72 (51) 
commercial banks, 48 (45) savings banks and 92 (83) credit cooperatives. The reduction in 
the number of banks is due to mergers and consolidation processes.11
Loan securitizations by Spanish banks include both issuances of securities backed 
by a particular portfolio of loans, which can be either mortgages (MBS or mortgage backed 
securities) or other types of loans
   
12 (ABS or asset backed securities), and issuances of 
covered bonds (cédulas hipotecarias in the original Spanish name). Issuances of MBS and 
ABS are initiated with the sale of a portfolio of loans from the originating bank to a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV), which then issues the MBS or ABS to investors in exchange of funds 
that are transferred to the originating bank. Typically, the originating bank also services the 
loan portfolio (i.e., receives the monthly payments, addresses arrears, etc.). Before 2005, 
regulation allowed banks to remove all the loans in MBS/ABS from their balance sheets, with 
the corresponding reduction in capital requirements. However, after 2005, a new accounting 
rule imposed on banks stricter requirements to remove securitized loans.13
                                                                            
10. We exclude branches of foreign banks, which have a negligible presence in retail banking in Spain.  
 Specifically, after 
2005, Spanish banks can reduce regulatory capital requirements by issuing MBS/ABS only if 
these operations actually transfer credit risk out of their balance sheets. Regulatory 
recognition of risk transfers requires that banks do not provide SPVs with credit 
enhancements, which compensate investors in the event of losses in the securitized portfolio.  
11. When banks merge, we consider them as separate entities before the merger and as a unique bank after the 
merger. 
12. Until 2004, banks only securitized mortgages (MBS) or issued covered bonds. From 2004 to 2006, MBS and 
securitization of covered bonds are still predominant, but banks started to issue ABS backed by auto loans, consumer 
loans, SME loans, loans to large firms and loans to the public sector. 
13. See the Appendix for more details on the change of requirements considered in the new regulation (Circular Banco 
de España CBE 4/2004).  
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A covered bond is secured not only by the full credit of the originating bank, but also 
by an eligible mortgage portfolio that acts as its specific collateral.14
From 2001 onwards, some groups of small banks securitize loans by first issuing 
covered bonds and then transferring those covered bonds to a joint SPV, which then 
issues bonds to investors. Small banks benefit from this multiple-bank securitization 
procedure, which improves the diversification of the underlying pool of assets and thus 
attracts additional investors. In our analysis, we consider the regular issuances of covered 
bonds and multiple-bank securitization as comparable in terms of the securitization 
decision, because they have similar economic and regulatory implications for the originating 
banks.
 Two regulatory 
requirements limit the issuance of covered bonds: (i) The eligible portfolio of collateralized 
loans can only include loans with a loan to value (LTV) less than 80%; and (ii) the amount 
securitized must be less than 80% of the value of the eligible portfolio (i.e., 
overcollateralization requirement). It is worth noting that the issuance of covered bonds has 
no immediate effect on regulatory capital. Eligible loans that back the covered bond remain in 
the originating bank’s balance sheet and required regulatory capital stays constant.  
15
We collect banks’ financial and accounting information from the confidential 
statements reported regularly to Banco de España, who is the regulator and supervisor of the 
Spanish banking system. These statements include bank balance sheets, income statements 
and statements of regulatory capital collected at the end of each calendar year from 1999 to 
2006. Additionally, we gather data on securitization issuances from two sources: (i) 
information for MBS/ABS is obtained from the brochures provided to investors by request of 
the Spanish financial market regulator (CNMV); (ii) information for covered bonds is obtained 
from incomplete partial set of brochures, which we complement with the balance sheet data 
in the confidential reports to Banco de España.  
 The main difference between these two forms of securitization is the type of 
issuer: small and regional banks formed groups and used multiple-bank securitization, 
whereas larger banks with access to capital markets issued covered bonds directly. From 
an economic perspective, however, both mechanisms transform illiquid assets stocked in 
the balance sheet of banks into tradable securities. 
Table 1 shows the number of banks that securitize for every year and form of bank. 
Out of the 212 banks that exist at the start of the sample, 103 securitize loans at least once 
during the sample period. Table 1 also reveals that the amount of securitized loans increases 
substantially for all types of institutions (e.g., from 1999 to 2006, the amount of securitized loans 
increases approximately sixteen-fold for commercial and savings banks). The main issuers of 
securitizations in absolute volume are savings banks and commercial banks. Nonetheless, the 
securitization activity for credit cooperatives has been non-negligible, reaching a market share of 
4.5% in 2006 which is similar to its weight in terms of total assets, 4.2%. 
                                                                            
14. This is similar to a secured bond issued by a non-financial corporation, which is guaranteed by both specific 
collateral and also the credit of the corporation itself.  
15. By 2006, multiple-bank securitization represented 41% of the total amount of covered bonds issued. 
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3  Securitization and financing choices  
In this section, we describe the Spanish banks’ financial condition during the period 1988-
2006. We compare the banks’ conditions in two sub-periods: a) the pre-securitization years 
(from 1988 to 1997) and b) the post-securitization years (from 1998 until 2006). As the 
issuance of securitized loans is viable on a large scale only after 1998, this comparison gives 
us a first approximation of the effects of securitization on bank behavior. In the post-
securitization period, we also compare the banks that use securitization to obtain financing 
with the banks that do not securitize their loans. 
3.1  Securitization and the evolution of balance sheets 
We group bank balance sheet accounts in different subcategories. On the asset side, we 
consider three groups of items: (1) LOANS, which measures credit of all maturities granted by 
a bank to the non-financial sector (i.e., households and firms); (2) GOVBONDS, which 
accounts for the amount of government debt held by a bank; and (3) INTERBANK, which 
reflects a bank’s net financial position in the interbank market (i.e., the difference between lent 
and borrowed funds, including the net position with the central bank). On the liability side, we 
consider four groups: (1) OWNFUNDS, which measures a bank’s equity position (i.e., capital, 
reserves and insolvency funds); (2) DEBT, which corresponds to the amount of debt financing 
issued by a bank in wholesale markets (excluding the interbank market); (3) DEPOSITS, which 
includes traditional demand deposits held by banks and (4) SEC, which consists of the sum of 
securitized instruments issued by a bank. In addition to these items, we calculate a residual 
account, i.e., REST, which is computed as the difference of the assets and liabilities not 
considered in the other groups described in this paragraph.16
A number of stylized facts emerge from the aggregate data of the different groups of 
bank accounts, which is displayed in Table 2 and in Figure 1. On the asset side, the 
emergence of securitization is associated with an increase in the weight of LOANS with 
respect to total bank assets, which rises from 68% in 1997 to 84.6% in 2006. By contrast, 
this weight remains fairly stable in the pre-securitization years. The growing importance of 
LOANS in the balance sheet is achieved at the expense of government debt (GOVBONDS), 
whose weight relative to total bank assets is reduced from 17% in 1997 to 4.1% in 2006. 
 
On the liability side, the start of the securitization period is connected with abrupt 
changes to the capital structure of Spanish banks. In the pre-securitization period, SEC is 
negligible, whereas DEBT and OWNFUNDS respectively represent an average of 5.1% and 
10.8% of bank liabilities. During these years, bank deposits are the dominant form of bank 
financing, i.e., the group DEPOSITS represents 84.2% of bank liabilities. From 1998 onwards, 
there is a drastic reduction of bank deposits (DEPOSITS amounts to 59.1% of bank liabilities 
in 2006), an increased reliance on securitization (SEC represents 19.8% of bank liabilities in 
2006) and, to some extent, on wholesale debt financing (i.e., the weight of DEBT with respect 
to bank liabilities rises to 12.3% in 2006). This reliance on market debt financing was a major 
shift in the capital structure of Spanish banks and it is analyzed in further detail in section 4. 
                                                                            
16. More specifically, REST includes the following asset side items: other holdings of financial assets (e. g, private fixed-
income debt, cash, and derivatives), positions in the bank trading book, corrections for writing-off assets and other asset 
items. On the liability side, REST includes derivatives, other commercial obligations with suppliers, short positions in 
securities from overdrafts in repo operations and financial guarantees. For a more detailed explanation of all the groups 
and their components, see the Appendix. 
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Finally, the contribution of OWNFUNDS to bank liabilities is reduced to 8.7% in 2006, 
revealing a process of leveraging in the post-securitization period that has been also 
documented in previous studies. 
Additional insight is gained from the comparison of the behavior of the banks that 
issue securitized loans to fund their operations and the banks that do not securitize. Figure 2 
shows that the expansion of credit during the post-securitization period is particularly intense 
for banks that choose to securitize (Figure 2A). These banks increase the weight of LOANS 
relative to total assets by 17.4 percentage points during the post-securitization years (from 
67.4% in 1997 to 84.8% in 2006). For banks that do not securitize (Figure 2B), there is 
however no significant increase in their loan base. While the weight of LOANS relative to total 
assets increases for banks that do not securitize from 75.1% in 1997 to 79.2% in 2006, this 
variation is not statistically different from zero. In addition, the depletion of the stock of liquid 
assets (i.e., government debt) is larger for securitizing banks (a decrease from 17.3% in 1997 
to 4.1%, significant at 1%) than for those banks that do not resort to securitization (a 
decrease from 13.5% to 5.2%, significant at 5%).  
On the liability side, there are also significant differences between securitizing and 
non-securitizing banks. Most notably, the reduction of the weight of DEPOSITS with respect 
to total liabilities is particularly intense for securitizing banks, with a decrease from 84.1% in 
1997 to 58.6% in 2006 (banks that do not securitize observe a change from 76.9% in 1997 
to 73.5% in 2006). This difference occurs because securitizing banks present an average 
deposit growth rate of 10.6%, which is inferior to the growth rate of 13.6% for the deposits of 
non-securitizing banks. In addition, securitizing banks use the funds obtained from 
securitization to substitute for deposits as a source of funds.17
3.2 Securitization and the reliance on deposits for credit expansion 
  
Our previous findings suggest that securitization contributes to the decoupling of the deposit 
and credit activities of financial intermediaries. To further examine this issue, we analyze the 
relation between credit and deposits in two periods of intense economic expansion in the 
Spanish economy: (i) the period 1988-1991, when securitization was unfeasible, and (ii) the 
period 2003-2006, when securitization was fully operative. In the former period, loan growth 
was limited by the evolution of deposits. In contrast, loans were able to grow in the latter 
period at a higher pace than deposits because banks had securitization as an additional 
financing source. It is precisely during an economic expansion when the demand for credit 
can increase at a higher pace than the volume of deposits.18
As Figure 3 indicates, credit growth is more than two times the deposit growth rate 
in the 2003-2006 period, whereas it follows closely the rate of growth of deposits during the 
1988-1991 period. The higher credit growth during the post-securitization period is likely due 
to a positive effect of securitization on bank credit supply rather than to a higher demand 
 An excessive reliance on deposit 
funding can left unattended part of the potential demand for credit and preclude an efficient 
intermediation process.  
                                                                            
17. Non-securitizing banks relied on debt issuances, which reached up to 15.6% of their assets, to fund their loan 
expansion. Securitizing banks also issued debt (12.2%), but used securitization more intensely (20.5%). 
18. Cornett et al. (2011) argue that the volume of core deposits might decrease during expansion periods because 
savers look for higher returns, and it might increase during recessions because deposits are perceived as safe assets. 
Since Table 2 shows that the volume of total deposits in Spain increases over time, our finding suggests that the 
recourse to securitization is not just compensating a fall in the volume of deposits, but it can be also due to an expansion 
of the demand for loans higher than deposit growth. 
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derived from stronger economic growth. In fact, the average GDP growth rate in the post-
securitization period was lower (3.5%) than in the pre-securitization period (4.1%). 
We examine more formally the link between deposit and credit growth across 
individual banks with a set of regressions of credit growth on deposit and GDP growth. 
Results are reported in Table 3. We consider both OLS and fixed effect specifications and 
both indicate that the coefficient of deposit growth falls by 40% for the total sample of banks 
from 1988-1991 to 2003-2006 (from 0.48 to 0.29 in OLS specifications (1) and (3), and from 
0.35 to 0.19 in the fixed effects specifications in (2) and (4)). This result shows that the 
relationship between deposit and credit growth is less intense after banks can securitize, and 
it is also consistent with the hypothesis that securitization contributes to decouple the credit 
and deposit activities of banks (Loutskina, 2011; Loutskina and Strahan, 2009). 
In Columns (5) to (8) of Table 3, we examine the relation between credit and deposit 
growth for the subgroups of securitizing and non-securitizing banks. In this analysis, the 
evidence is less conclusive. Securitizing banks exhibit a relatively low coefficient on deposit 
growth in the OLS specifications (i.e., 0.30 in (5) relative to 0.47 for non-securitizing banks in 
(7)). However, we fail to find a stronger relationship between credit and deposit growth for 
non-securitizing banks once we include fixed effects (i.e., the deposit growth coefficient is 
0.27 for securitizing banks in (6) and 0.23 for non-securitizing banks in (8)). A possible reason 
for these mixed results is that some common factors explain both securitization decisions and 
the growth rates of loans and deposits, making more difficult the interpretation of coefficients 
in these simple regressions. To consider this issue and other possibilities, we examine more 
carefully next the factors that affect banks’ securitization decisions. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1506 
4 The determinants of the securitization decision 
We consider insights that emanate from existing theories of capital structure to the case of 
banking firms in order to derive some testable predictions about their decision to securitize. In 
particular, we hypothesize that securitization alters the optimal mix of banks’ financing 
choices because it (i) provides a novel source of finance whose attractiveness depends on 
banks financial choices (trade-off theory) and (ii) facilitates the access to market financing of 
banks facing severe adverse selection problems (pecking order theory).   
The trade-off theory insights are based on the premise that banks that alter their 
capital structure and decide to securitize are those banks that are financially constrained i.e., 
that find it relatively more costly to finance investment opportunities with pre-existing sources 
of funds. In order to identify financially constrained banks, we consider three different 
dimensions: (i) the relative cost of securitization with respect to other funding alternatives, (ii) 
the growth opportunities in the banks’ loan portfolios, and (iii) the liquidity position of banks. 
Our hypothesis is that banks whose sources of funds are relatively more expensive, banks 
with more growth opportunities and banks with tighter liquidity conditions are more likely to 
benefit from the new financing possibility offered by securitization.  
The pecking order theory suggests a more specific insight: securitization grants 
banks access to public market financing without facing an adverse selection high discount. 
More specifically, securitization mitigates adverse selection since it reduces the informational 
problems associated with the direct sale of loans or pools of loans (DeMarzo, 2005). To 
examine the empirical relevance of this insight, we analyze whether banks that are more 
affected by adverse selection costs are those that resort relatively more to raising market 
funds through securitization. 
The rest of this section presents the variables that are used to proxy for the 
determinants of securitization among Spanish banks, an explanation of the empirical 
methodology employed for analysis and the results. 
4.1 Variables 
We distinguish five groups of explanatory variables: (1) proxies related to financing costs, (2) 
proxies related to liquidity, (3) proxies related to the growth opportunities of banks, (4) 
variables related to the market access possibilities of banks and (5) other control variables. 
4.1.1 FINANCING COSTS 
We have argued that the financial benefits of securitization are likely to be larger for banks that 
are constrained in their investment policy by their inability to resort to other sources of 
financing such as demand deposits, interbank loans and debt and equity issuances. These 
constraints could appear in the form of high financing costs associated with available funding 
alternatives. Banks can benefit from securitization provided that this financing source presents 
a lower relative financing cost than the existing alternatives. 
Since we do not have price information to measure the costs of alternative financing 
sources, we use the relative amount of financial instruments held by the banks in the pre-
securitization period as proxies for the cost of the alternative financing sources. Implicitly this 
assumes that the observed capital structures of banks are the result of profit-maximizing 
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strategies that take into account differences in the marginal financial costs of alternative 
financial sources. For instance, if a bank concentrates its financing in the pre-securitization 
period in only one source (i.e., deposits), one would expect that this source is particularly 
inexpensive for the bank (or alternatively that the financing cost of other funding alternatives is 
relatively higher). In this case, securitization would be less beneficial for banks with highly-
concentrated sources of finance, (since this probably reflects the access to a low cost 
financing source) and would be more beneficial to banks whose capital structure contains a 
wide set of sources.   
In particular, for each bank-year, we consider the following variables for relative 
financing costs: 
(i) Dep/Loans, Interbank/ Loans, Debt/Loans, Equity/Loans: The ratio of each 
financing source with respect to total loans provides a measure of the constraints faced by a 
bank in its credit operations. We consider four possible sources of financing for banks: 
deposits, net financing from the interbank market,19
(ii) Concentration: As an alternative measure of the concentration of financing 
sources we construct the ratio of the sum of squares of financing sources divided by the 
square of the sum of all the sources, that is, 
 debt and equity. Banks that have better 
access to one of these funding sources (i.e., low financial costs, better availability of funds, an 
extensive branch network to access retail deposit markets) will finance a higher proportion of 
their loan operations with this financing source. We expect that these banks have lower 
incentives to securitize, because they already have access to a relatively cheap financing 
source. 
( )2
222
EquityDebtInterbank
EquityDebtInterbank
++
++ . Concentration is 
bounded between 1, when a bank has only one source of financing in addition to deposits, 
and 1/3, when a bank uses the same amount of the three market sources of funds. 
According to the logic stated above, banks with a dominant financing source will feature a 
higher Concentration measure and should exhibit a lower tendency to securitize. It is 
important to note that we do not include deposits in this ratio and consider them in the 
separate variable Dep/Loans to isolate the effect of this traditional and large source of bank 
financing from financing alternatives in public financial markets. 
4.1.2  LIQUIDITY 
Banks with have higher (lower) liquidity constraints are potentially subject to higher investment 
constraints and, thus, they are more likely to securitize. We use banks liquidity holdings as an 
inverse measure of their liquidity constraints. Specifically, we consider two variables to 
describe the liquidity of a bank: 
(i) Liquidity / Loans: This numerator of this measure consists of the sum of the 
government debt and the net volume of deposits held in the interbank market, including the 
net position with the central bank. This definition of liquid assets is similar to the measure 
suggested in Basel III, i.e., High Quality Liquid Assets in the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, LCR. 
We expect a negative relation between a bank’s incentives to securitize and the ratio of this 
liquidity buffer with respect to the volume of loans that are to be financed. 
                                                                            
19. The net interbank position is defined as Max{Interbank Loans – Interbank Deposits, 0}. 
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(ii) Past profitability / Loans: This variable is a proxy of the availability of internally 
generated funds that can be used to finance new loans. This variable is computed as the ratio 
of the profits of the previous year net of the distributed dividends with respect to the volume 
of loans to be financed. We expect that banks with higher retained earnings will have lower 
incentives to securitize. 
4.1.3  GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES 
Banks with potentially higher growth opportunities are more likely to need financing, and 
securitization may help to cover this need. In order to capture growth potential, the existing 
literature suggests the use of the price-to-book ratio (e.g. the Tobin’s Q ratio)20 however, 
since a very large part of the banks in our sample are non-publicly traded we consider the 
following alternative proxies:21
(i) Projected Loan Growth: We estimate a series of projected loan growth (which we 
identify with banks growth opportunities) that we define as: 
  
1
1
−
−−
t
tt
A
LL
, where Lt is the 
balance of loans at the end of year t, and At-1 is the total assets at the end of year t-1. We use 
the ratio of the absolute difference of loan balances on year t and t-1 with respect to total 
assets on year t-1 to avoid large growth rates caused by small initial loan balances and to be 
consistent with the rest of variables defined below. Specifically, we estimate an autoregressive 
model that explains loan growth on year t as a function of the loan growth on year t-1 and t-2 
with a rolling window of 10 years, which avoids differences in standard errors due to the 
growing number of years for observations that are observed later in the time horizon. For 
each year after t, we obtain the best prediction (based on the observed loan growth for years 
t-1 and t-2) of loan growth. The variable loans, Lt, includes loans to the public sector and 
loans to non-financial firms and households (both residents and non-residents).  
We validate this proxy (i.e., the extent to which it measures bank growth 
opportunities) by considering its statistical relationship with the Tobin’s Q ratio for the 
subsample of banks whose equity is publicly traded. In particular we regress Tobin’s Q using 
as explanatory variables Projected Loan Growth and the rest of the explanatory variables 
considered in our model of the decision to securitize. We find that Projected Loan Growth is 
statistically significant at 1% while the rest of variables are not significant (OLS with robust 
standard errors clustered at bank level) and the R2 amounts to 23%. When Projected Loan 
Growth is the only explanatory variable, the sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the 
coefficient remains unchanged, and it can explain up to 12% of the total variation of the price-
to-book ratio. 
(ii) As an alternative proxy for growth opportunities we use GrowthOpp i.e., the 
number of new regional markets in which banks enter to operate and the sum of GDP for the 
regional markets of bank operations. This alternative proxy is considered in the robustness 
analysis to test the validity of the results of the main specifications. 
4.1.4 MARKET ACCESS 
Banks’ accessibility to financial markets can affect their use of securitization in different ways. 
On the one hand, a bank with previous access to the market can use this new financing 
                                                                            
20. See Frank and Goyal (2008) for a review. 
21. Savings banks and credit cooperatives are not listed in the Stock Market because of their legal nature.  As for 
commercial banks, only 14 banks out of 51 in our sample were listed in the Stock Market. 
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channel without a big investment in market recognition and lower transaction costs. On the 
other hand, securitization opens radically new financing possibilities for private banks which 
have been excluded from market access in the past. To analyze these alternatives we 
consider two different proxies:  
lnAssets: Larger banks are more likely to encounter lower transaction costs of 
accessing financial markets and, thus, they be more likely to securitize. 
Savings and Coop: Savings banks and credit cooperatives had very restricted 
access to financial markets before securitization. Therefore, they are more likely to find 
securitization attractive. These two dummy variables take the value of 1 if the bank is a 
savings bank or a credit cooperative and zero otherwise. We expect a positive coefficient if 
the hypothesis that securitization enables firms to reduce the costs of adverse selection holds 
in the data. 
4.1.5 OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES 
These variables aim to capture whether the decision of banks to securitize has been driven by 
other securitization determinants, such as the possibility to manage credit risk in their 
portfolios or to perform regulatory capital arbitrage. We consider three proxies: 
(i) NPL: The ratio of non-performing loans over total loans (NPL) in bank portfolios 
reveals their credit standards and levels of accumulated risk. We expect banks with a higher 
NPL to have riskier loans and stronger incentives to transfer those risks to investors via 
securitization.22
 (ii) RegCap: A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the Basel regulatory capital 
ratio is below the 25th percentile of the distribution and zero otherwise.
 
23
(iii) Mortg/Loans: Mortgages are the most common underlying asset used in 
securitizations. Therefore, the weight of mortgage loans in a bank balance sheet controls for 
the possibility that banks with a higher proportion of mortgages securitize more often.   
 The regulatory 
capital ratio is computed by dividing regulatory capital (the portion of capital eligible to fulfill 
the capital requirements of the Basel Committee) by bank assets weighted according to their 
risk (Risk Weighted Assets or RWA). Banks closer to the regulatory limit, which is set at 8% in 
the Basel requirements, can find useful to use ABS/MBS as an instrument to ensure 
regulatory compliance.  
4.2 Empirical strategy and results 
We perform three sets of tests. First, we estimate two alternative specifications of a Probit 
model to investigate the determinants of the banks’ decision to securitize (i.e., the “extensive 
margin”). We examine both the year-to-year decisions to securitize (with a panel dataset of 
bank conditions) and the decision to securitize at least once during the post-securitization 
period (with a cross sectional dataset of the initial conditions of banks at the start of this 
period). We consider this second estimation approach to account for the possibility that the 
decision to securitize is part of a long-term financial strategy and then require several years for 
its full implementation. Second, we estimate a Tobit model to analyze the determinants of the 
                                                                            
22. If riskier loans require more bank monitoring, this opposite effect may reduce the incentives to securitize high risk 
loans. 
23. As discussed below, we consider alternative definitions of this variable including other cut-off values. 
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amount of assets securitized by banks (i.e., the “intensive margin”), also considering the two 
estimation approaches used for the Probit model. Finally, we estimate duration models for the 
decision to securitize and explore which variables determine the speed at which a bank 
decides to securitize for the first time. 
4.2.1 RESULTS ON THE DECISION TO SECURITIZE 
Table 4 presents the marginal effects of the Probit regressions, which are estimated with 
robust standard errors clustered at the bank level. Columns (1) and (2) display results for the 
Probit models that relate the decision of securitizing at least once during the 1999-2006 
period to the values on year 1999 of the proxy variables for the determinants of securitization. 
The year 1999 is the first when securitization became available to banks. Column (1) includes 
all the financing alternatives relative to the volume of loans (Dep/Loans, Interbank/Loans, 
Debt/Loans, Equity/Loans) and column (2) replaces these variables with Concentration. As 
shown in (1) while other financial cost proxies are not statistically significant, the coefficient of 
Dep/Loans is negative and statistically significant in (1) which suggests that banks with lower 
relative marginal cost for deposits at the beginning of the securitization year are less likely to 
securitize during that period. In (2) Concentration has the expected negative sign but fails to 
be statistically significant.  
Banks with a higher stock of liquid assets with respect to loans (Liquidity/Loans) in 
1999 are less likely to securitize. However, we do not find evidence that internally generated 
funds from past profits (Past Profit/Loans) reduce the incentives to securitize. 
The coefficient on Projected Loan Growth is positive and highly significant which 
indicates that banks used securitization to fund credit growth, in line with preliminary evidence 
in Figure 3. Securitization is associated with a substantial increase in the growth rate of 
banks’ balance sheets, which increased from 8.9% per annum during the pre-securitization 
years to 14.0% during the post-securitization period. 
There is also a positive and significant coefficient for lnAssets, suggesting that large 
banks with an existing record of operations in financial markets can gain access to 
securitization. In addition, we find evidence that, other things equal, savings banks and credit 
cooperatives are more likely to securitize than commercial banks. This result is consistent with 
the hypothesis that securitization can reduce adverse selection problems if groups of banks 
can jointly issue bonds backed by a common loan portfolio. 
As for other control variables, there is no evidence that Spanish banks used 
securitization as a risk management tool (i.e., to mitigate and transfer credit risk) or as a mean 
to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage. This result could be explained by the tougher 
regulation on conduits and SIV (Structured Investment Vehicles) in Spain, which was precisely 
designed to limit off-balance sheet risks and regulatory capital arbitrage.24
Columns (3) and (4) provide results for the Probit models that relate the decision of 
securitizing at least once during the period 1999-2002 to the situation of the banks in 1999. 
The results are similar to the estimates in (1) and (2), suggesting that the banks that 
securitized during the period 1999-2006 already made the decision to securitize during the 
initial sub-period 1999-2002.  
 
                                                                            
24. Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2013) study conduits as a case of "regulatory arbitrage", and they notice that banks 
based in Spain and Portugal did not set up conduits. 
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Columns (5) and (6) show the estimates obtained with the panel data of year to year 
securitization decisions. In these models, the bank decision to securitize in year t is explained 
by the value of explanatory variables in year t-1. The qualitative results are similar to the 
previous estimations in columns (1) to (4), though the magnitude of the coefficients is 
generally smaller. The variable Interbank/Loans becomes statistically significant, but 
Dep/Loans loses its significance and none of the other financial cost proxies is significant in 
(5). As stated above, these weaker findings could be the result of the time frame for the 
decision to securitize. Securitization choices would not be made on a yearly basis, but they 
would rather form part of medium to long-term financial strategy. 
We perform a number of tests to evaluate the robustness of the above results. First, 
we consider additional growth proxies as explanatory variables. Therefore, as alternative 
controls of bank growth possibilities, we include: (i) the (weighted) GDP growth of all the 
regions where a bank operates and (ii) a dummy variable that identifies banks opening 
branches in new regional markets. We expect that banks will have higher growth 
opportunities if they operate in regions with high economic growth or they have entered new 
markets. The coefficient for weighted GDP growth is significant at the 5% level if this variable 
is the only control for growth opportunities in the model for the decision to securitize. If both 
weighted GDP growth and the dummy identifying new entrants are included, the coefficient 
on the former variable is only significant at the 10% level. The dummy identifying new entrants 
is not significant even when included as the single proxy for growth possibilities. When we 
include these two proxies together with Projected Loan Growth, the latter variable is 
significant at the 5% level whereas the weighted GDP growth and the dummy for new 
entrants are found to be not significant. Thus, we interpret that the three variables are 
capturing a common effect, and that Projected Loan Growth captures all the relevant 
information contained in the other two variables.  
For the panel data models, we also consider two additional dummy variables as 
proxies for access to financial markets: (i) a dummy for banks listed in the stock market and 
(ii) a dummy for banks that have issued at some point in time debt instruments in wholesale 
markets. The results show positive and significant coefficients for these variables, in line with 
the predictions of theoretical models. Nevertheless, these variables are not included in the 
main analysis because they are highly correlated with the identity of some banks, creating an 
overfitting problem (i. e., perfect predictions for some banks) in the regressions for the 
decision to securitize. 
4.2.2 RESULTS ON THE AMOUNT SECURITIZED 
Table 5 displays results for the models of the asset amounts securitized by Spanish banks 
(i.e., the “intensive margin”), which are estimated with a Tobit specification with standard 
errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at bank level. The dependent variable is the 
amount of funds securitized by a bank normalized by the size of its assets, but the results 
presented in Table 5 still follow the same structure as the estimates of the Probit models in 
Table 4. The explanatory variables are the same as in the Probit analysis of subsection 4.2.1. 
For columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the amount of funds securitized by a bank 
during the whole 1999-2006 period (normalized by the size of its assets in 2006) and 
explanatory variables are fixed at their values on year 1999. Columns (3) and (4) present 
results for specifications analogous to (1) and (2), but with a shorter time horizon from 1999 to 
2002. Columns (5) and (6) correspond to the results from panel data estimation, which uses 
the amount securitized on year t as dependent variable and the proxies on year t-1 as 
explanatory variables. 
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Comparing the coefficients of the explanatory variables on Table 4 and Table 5, we 
observe that the proxies for liquidity, growth opportunities and market access maintain their 
sign and statistical significance. These determinants of the securitization decision have a 
comparable qualitative impact on the intensive and extensive margins. 
The conclusions about the effect of financial costs are also comparable in Table 4 
and Table 5, but not all the coefficients for this sub-set of variables are equal across 
specifications. In Table 5, evidence of the effect of financial costs on securitization is 
supported by the negative and statistically significant coefficients of Interbank/Loans and 
Equity/Loans in columns (1) and (3) (instead of Dep/Loans as in Table 4) and Dep/Loans and 
Interbank/Loans in column (5) (instead of only Interbank/Loans as in Table 4).  Finally, other 
control variables do not have a significant effect on the amount securitized, as it was the case 
for the decision to securitize. 
4.2.3 RESULTS FROM DURATION ANALYSIS 
Table 6 presents estimates of the duration models, which assume that the time elapsed until 
a bank securitizes for the first time is governed by a parameterized hazard rate. The function 
),( Xth  for the hazard rate is defined as the product of a common time factor and a 
function of bank level variables that captures observed heterogeneity across banks, i.e., 
βiXethXth ⋅= )(),( 0 . Columns (1) and (2) in Table 6 report results for an exponential 
model with a constant conditional probability of securitization over time, 
βiXeXth =),( , 
while estimates in columns (3) and (4) correspond to a Weibull model. This alternative 
specification assumes a monotonic dependence of the hazard rate on time, 
βiXp eptXth 1),( −= . The probability to securitize increases (decreases) over time if p>1 
(p<1), whereas p=1 implies the reversion to the base exponential model. The results are 
presented in the form of exponential coefficients (i.e., 
βˆe ), which can be directly interpreted 
as increases in the baseline hazard rate.25
 When we allow for time dependency of the hazard rate, we observe that the 
probability to securitize increases over time: the estimates of p are 1.9 and 1.91 in the Weibull 
specifications in columns (3) and (4). This result is consistent with the increasing number of 
securitizations over time reported in Table 1. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients of 
bank level variables are not significantly affected by the assumption of time dependence of 
the hazard rate. We thus provide unified comments on these coefficients for the specifications 
with and without time dependence. 
 
We observe that a higher deposit base (Dep/Loans) is associated with a longer time 
until first securitization, which is an outcome consistent with the results for the Probit and 
Tobit models. The coefficients on the Concentration variable in columns (2) and (4) are 
positive and similar in size, though we only observe a significant result in the Weibull 
specification. A high value of Concentration or Dep/Loans implies strong reliance on a single 
financing source during the pre-securitization period and, given the estimated coefficients, a 
longer period of time until the first securitization. These results for Dep/Loans and 
Concentration support again the hypothesis that a large base of a pre-existing financing 
                                                                            
25. For instance, Ke βˆ =1.2 implies that an increase in 1 unit in Xk leads to an increase of the baseline hazard rate by 
1.2 and a decrease in the expected time to securitize. On the contrary, Ke βˆ <1 implies that an increase in 1 unit in Xk 
lengthens the amount of time until the bank securitizes. 
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source is associated with a low relative financial cost of that source and therefore a lower 
probability of using new financing alternatives.  
Other variables with significant coefficients include Projected Loan Growth, Savings, 
Coop and lnAssets. All of these variables receive coefficients higher than 1 and an increase in 
the value of one of them reduces the expected time until the first securitization. This result is 
consistent with the positive relation found between these variables and the decision to 
securitize, as reported in Table 4 and Table 5.  
In order to evaluate the predictive power of the duration models, we present in Figure 4 
the distribution across banks of the predicted number of years until first securitization. The 
specification in Column (3) of Table 6 is used to produce the predictions. We present separately 
the distributions of securitizing and non-securitizing banks. The model predicts a lower number 
of years until first securitization for banks that actually securitized. The distribution for this type of 
banks is concentrated around values below 5 years: 63% and 93% of the cases for securitizing 
banks receive respectively predictions below 5 and 10 years. For non-securitizing banks, the 
distribution is more dispersed and the time until first securitization is predicted larger than 10 
years for 78% of the cases, which is out of the temporal scope of the sample.  
Empirical analysis based on different models and estimation techniques provides 
evidence consistent with some key theoretical predictions. More specifically, banks are found 
to be more likely to securitize when the costs of alternative sources of funds are higher, 
growth opportunities are higher and the proportion of liquid assets held in balance sheets is 
lower. There is also evidence that savings banks and credit cooperatives are more likely to 
make early use of securitization than commercial banks. We argue that the reason for this 
latter result is that securitization grants these banks with a form of access to financial markets 
that was not previously available to them. In the next section, we provide further analysis to of 
the link between the access to financial markets through securitization and the reduction of 
costs related to asymmetric information. 
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5 Securitization and the pecking order of financing choices 
In this section, we further investigate the hypothesis of whether securitization particularly 
affects banks that bear high informational costs to access capital markets. Specifically, we 
examine how securitization fits in the pecking order of financing choices by banks. To 
examine the securitization decision we build on the analysis of Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) and Bharath et al. (2009) and consider whether banks are 
likely to first choose securitization over other sources of funds and whether this effect is more 
pronounced when they face more severe adverse selection problems. 
Our analysis modifies the conventional pecking order equation in previous empirical 
corporate finance to adapt it to the case of bank securitization. In a typical corporate finance 
case, the basic test examines whether a firm’s financial deficit (FD) can explain the increase of 
its debt (∆D).26
ititit eFDD ++=∆ βα
 More specifically, the typical study is to estimate a regression of the form:
 and tests the hypothesis β=1 (i. e., financial needs are covered 
only by issuing new debt).   
Similarly we estimate a regression of the amount of (new) securitized loans on the 
bank’s financial deficit (FD). For bank i on year t, we define its financial deficit as:` 
ititititititit REST +RESERVES +GOVBONDS +INTERBANK +DEPOSITS -LOANS = FD ∆∆∆∆∆∆  [1] 
where RESERVES consists of banks’ reserves, including current profits, and the rest of 
variables have been defined in section 3. We then consider the following specification: 
ititit eFDSEC ++= βα                   [2] 
and estimate β for different types of banks.  
Following the insights in Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu (2009) we argue that firms are 
more affected by pecking order considerations at the time of issuing new securities if adverse 
selection problems are severe. We also follow their specific methodology and include in the 
pecking order equation the interaction of FD with a measure of asymmetric information. 
Specifically, we interact the variable FD with three indicator variables: Small, Savings and 
Coop, which identify respectively small banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives. We 
define a bank as small if its total assets fall below the 30th percentile of the sample distribution 
of bank assets. In particular we estimate: 
itiitiitititit
itiitiiiitit
eCoopFDSavingsFDSmallFDFD
SmallCoopSmallSavingsCoopSavingsSmallSEC
+⋅+⋅+⋅++
+⋅+⋅++++=
21
543210
δδγβ
αααααα        [3] 
and test the hypotheses: 0,0 1 >> δγ , and 02 >δ . Intuitively, the coefficient on FD is 
expected to be higher for small and non-listed banks, which are thought to finance a higher 
proportion of their financial deficit through the issuance of securitized loans. 
                                                                            
26. The previous literature usually rejects the null hypothesis of β=1 (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Frank and Goyal, 
2003; Fama and French, 2005) and finds values estimates of beta smaller than 1. Empirical evidence shows that firms 
typically combine the issuance of debt and capital to finance their financial deficits. 
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Table 7 presents our estimates for the sample of banks with a positive financial 
deficit. We report robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the bank level. 
The first column of Table 7 shows the results of the base specification in [2]. We find that β<1, 
which implies the rejection of a strict (and more narrow) version of the pecking order 
hypothesis. Column (2) in Table 7 presents the results for a specification that includes the 
interactions of FD with the indicators Savings and Coop. For credit cooperatives, we obtain a 
positive coefficient on the interaction with FD, which is significant at the 5% level. 
Specification in column (3) includes the interaction FD∙Small, which also has a positive and 
significant coefficient. To disentangle the effects of size and legal nature, the specification in 
column (4) includes all the previously used variables and additional interactions of FD∙Small 
with the dummies for Savings and Coop. The results show that FD, FD∙Coop and 
FD∙Savings∙Small receive statistically significant coefficients. These estimates suggest 
stronger preference for securitization among medium-large credit cooperatives and small 
savings banks. Indeed, credit cooperatives and small savings banks are candidates to face 
severe informational problems and restricted access to debt and equity markets. In summary, 
Table 7 provides suggestive evidence that this type of banks used securitization as a tool to 
reduce adverse selection costs and raise funds in wholesale financial markets. 
As a robustness check, we use alternative thresholds for the definition of small 
banks. Thus, we define a bank as small if its size is smaller than the 5th, 10th, 20th, 40th and 
50th percentiles of the distribution of the banks’ assets, as alternative limits to the 30th 
percentile used in Table 7. Estimation of specification (4) in Table 7 is then repeated with the 
redefined Small indicators. The results on the coefficients of FD and FD∙Coop are not 
sensitive to the definition of Small. However, the coefficient of FD∙Savings∙Small is not 
significant if the size threshold used for Small is lower than the 15th percentile or higher than 
the 50th percentile. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1506 
6 Conclusions 
Securitization enables banks to shift from a traditional business model financed through the 
expansion of deposits to new business models that rely on the demand for securitized assets 
in international financial markets. In this study we find that securitization is also associated 
with substantial changes in the capital structure and funding policies of banks, in particular a 
substantial reduction in their reliance on deposits as a financing source. In addition, 
securitizing banks are observed to increase their loan volumes and their ratios of loans over 
total assets, whereas they decrease their holdings of low-return liquid assets.  
The transition to a more market-dependent financing model has enabled banks to 
decouple the evolution of their credit activity from the capacity to raise deposits. This financial 
development, however, has also increased the vulnerability of banks to shocks in the financial 
markets. Non-securitizing banks have maintained a high weight of deposits over total funds 
and they have been able to cope better with the higher financial constraints observed after 
the start of the crisis in 2007 (Cornett et al., 2011). In this study, we fail to find evidence that 
relates securitization to banks credit risk management or regulatory capital arbitrage. While 
this may be due to our particular sample, we are able by contrast to provide evidence that 
relates the banks’ securitization choice to other financing choices made by banks in order to 
fund their credit expansions. 
Our cross-sectional findings are also interesting and consistent with the idea that the 
benefits of securitization can be associated to certain bank characteristics that correlate with 
their capital structure choices. Our empirical analysis indicates a positive relation between 
securitization benefits and the presence of funding constraints on credit growth, which can 
take the form of high cost of financial alternatives or outright exclusion from financial markets. 
We find evidence that securitization can grant access to financial markets to banks that were 
previously excluded due to severe adverse selection problems. Securitization is higher in the 
pecking order of financing choices for these financially constrained banks than for banks less 
affected by information asymmetries.  
During recent years, securitization has been stigmatized because of its relation 
with the financial crisis initiated in 2007. The number of new issuances and the total volume 
of securitized loans have both drastically decreased, transforming banks’ capital structures. 
Banks have been forced to either revert to the traditional deposit-based model or to rely on 
funds from central banks to fill in the funding gap left by the decrease in securitization 
activity. However, there are perspectives of a medium to long-term recovery in 
securitization markets (Bloommestein et al., 2011). The results in the current article suggest 
that there can be consequences associated to the elimination of securitization as a source 
of bank financing. In particular, if credit expansion by banks is a desirable policy objective, it 
may be necessary to provide alternative and flexible financing sources to banks, particularly 
to those institutions which find it more difficult issuing capital throughout the traditional 
forms of finance i.e., debt and equity.  
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Tables and figures 
Table 1. Number of banks, Securitizing banks and Volume of Securitization 
 
Comm. 
Banks
Savings 
Banks
Credit 
Coop.
Comm. 
Banks
Savings 
Banks
Credit 
Coop.
Comm. 
Banks
Savings 
Banks
Credit 
Coop.
Comm. 
Banks
Savings 
Banks
Credit 
Coop.
1999 72 48 92 7 17 3 9,7 35,4 3,3 10.434 11.182 190
2000 68 46 90 9 13 3 13,2 28,3 3,3 16.067 11.101 343
2001 66 45 88 10 33 11 15,2 73,3 12,5 17.088 21.378 572
2002 61 45 84 10 30 10 16,4 66,7 11,9 30.632 33.150 1.378
2003 57 45 83 11 39 16 19,3 86,7 19,3 48.550 57.486 3.368
2004 54 45 83 20 41 17 37,0 91,1 20,5 80.763 77.472 6.901
2005 52 45 83 20 44 22 38,5 97,8 26,5 115.345 122.122 11.133
2006 51 45 83 22 43 24 43,1 95,6 28,9 161.526 179.870 16.242
Total Number of Banks Number of Banks that Securitize at t
Balance of Securitization 
(mill€)
Perc. Banks that Securitize 
at t (%)
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Table 2: Balance sheet of the Spanish Banking system 
 
A. Volumes (Billions of Euros) 
LOANS INTERBANK GOV BONDS REST DEPOSITS DEBT OWN FUNDS SEC
1988 156.63 10.70 50.16 23.99 203.25 12.23 26.00 0.00
1989 178.77 16.07 59.61 22.87 237.76 11.00 28.55 0.00
1990 203.07 -3.11 68.15 45.90 268.91 10.98 34.13 0.00
1991 233.32 2.98 55.91 55.79 293.34 13.36 41.30 0.00
1992 255.01 -2.12 58.47 64.78 316.42 7.76 46.67 5.30
1993 267.49 11.01 64.67 74.87 348.43 9.41 52.80 7.40
1994 282.93 -1.29 85.69 77.31 373.00 11.12 53.19 7.32
1995 303.58 15.82 97.81 75.53 418.09 11.66 54.88 8.10
1996 332.33 9.20 104.91 76.42 441.93 15.17 57.62 8.14
1997 380.19 1.39 94.92 81.93 470.34 19.81 60.06 8.22
1998 435.30 -31.10 93.81 89.30 494.98 21.56 61.71 9.05
1999 493.03 -35.33 94.35 111.53 538.68 46.64 65.80 12.46
2000 605.71 -17.72 91.83 108.86 653.11 29.98 74.68 32.15
2001 648.01 -4.12 99.53 122.49 707.67 36.62 82.55 39.07
2002 720.14 -5.68 102.30 119.61 743.40 38.12 89.65 65.20
2003 824.55 -29.94 111.29 137.30 776.18 60.40 97.16 109.45
2004 972.32 -12.07 93.28 154.45 812.56 108.23 121.94 165.23
2005 1226.88 -34.57 92.73 199.43 930.60 167.01 138.11 248.75
2006 1526.40 17.85 74.10 186.26 1066.66 222.72 157.17 358.08
ASSETS LIABILITIES
Billions 
€
 
B. Percentages of Total Assets 
LOANS INTERBANK GOV BONDS REST DEPOSITS DEBT OWN FUNDS SEC
1988 64.87 4.43 20.77 9.93 84.17 5.06 10.77 0.00
1989 64.47 5.79 21.49 8.25 85.74 3.97 10.30 0.00
1990 64.67 -0.99 21.70 14.62 85.63 3.50 10.87 0.00
1991 67.05 0.86 16.07 16.03 84.29 3.84 11.87 0.00
1992 67.80 -0.56 15.55 17.22 84.12 2.06 12.41 1.41
1993 63.99 2.63 15.47 17.91 83.35 2.25 12.63 1.77
1994 63.63 -0.29 19.27 17.39 83.89 2.50 11.96 1.65
1995 61.61 3.21 19.85 15.33 84.85 2.37 11.14 1.64
1996 63.56 1.76 20.07 14.62 84.52 2.90 11.02 1.56
1997 68.08 0.25 17.00 14.67 84.23 3.55 10.76 1.47
1998 74.12 -5.30 15.97 15.20 84.28 3.67 10.51 1.54
1999 74.30 -5.32 14.22 16.81 81.18 7.03 9.92 1.88
2000 76.80 -2.25 11.64 13.80 82.68 3.80 9.45 4.07
2001 74.84 -0.48 11.49 14.15 81.73 4.23 9.53 4.51
2002 76.91 -0.61 10.92 12.77 79.39 4.07 9.57 6.96
2003 79.04 -2.87 10.67 13.16 74.40 5.79 9.31 10.49
2004 80.49 -1.00 7.72 12.79 67.27 8.96 10.09 13.68
2005 82.65 -2.33 6.25 13.43 62.69 11.25 9.30 16.76
2006 84.58 0.99 4.11 10.32 59.11 12.34 8.71 19.84
ASSETS LIABILITIES
Perc. of 
Assets
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Table 3. Estimation of the relation between credit and deposit growth 
 
Deposit Growth 0.48 *** 0.35 *** 0.29 *** 0.19 *** 0.30 *** 0.27 *** 0.47 *** 0.23 ***
(0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.08)
GDP Growth -3.60 *** -0.73 4.71 *** 4.59 *** 6.21 *** 6.18 *** 6.04 * 6.56 **
(1.07) (0.78) (1.25) (1.04) (1.70) (1.50) (3.57) (3.33)
Intercept 0.23 *** 0.16 *** -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.12 -0.12
(0.04) (0.33) (0.03) (0.001) (0.06) (0.06) (0.125) (0.12)
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Observ 578 578 743 743 433 433 307 307
2003-2006 2003-2006
(1) (2) (5) (6)
1988-1991  2003-2006
Total Banks Securitizing Banks
(3) (4) (7) (8)
Total Banks Non-Securitizing Banks
Note. Credit Growth is the dependent variable in all the estimations. Symbols: p<0.01 = ***, p<0.05 = **, p<0.1 = *. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Probit estimation of the decision to securitize 
 
Financial Cost Proxies
Dep/Loans -0.226 ** -0.009 -0.247 ** -0.014 -0.059 -0.030
(0.114) (0.053) (0.121) (0.055) (0.037) (0.023)
Interbank/ Loans -0.491 -0.472 -0.358 ***
(0.420) (0.429) (0.121)
Debt / Loans 0.421 0.391 -0.074
(1.359) (1.448) (0.127)
Equity / Loans 4.265 2.346 -0.448
(2.863) (1.862) (0.567)
Concentration -0.843 -0.825 -0.221
(0.702) (0.607) (0.143)
Liquidity Proxies
Past Profitability / Loans -4.770 1.925 -3.903 3.374 -1.635 -2.261
(9.354) (6.418) (9.758) (6.488) (1.721) (1.726)
Liquidity / Loans -1.309 * -1.398 *** -1.347 * -1.532 *** -0.561 *** -0.609 ***
(0.731) (0.477) (0.744) (0.534) (0.180) (0.153)
Growth Proxies
Projected Loan Growth 23.485 *** 18.393 *** 25.961 *** 21.356 *** 2.967 ** 2.748 **
(5.539) (5.730) (5.512) (5.665) (1.206) (1.190)
Access to Markets
Savings 0.576 *** 0.489 *** 0.629 *** 0.545 *** 0.392 *** 0.449 ***
(0.129) (0.120) (0.131) (0.126) (0.073) (0.075)
Coop 0.695 *** 0.661 *** 0.738 *** 0.706 *** 0.200 *** 0.299 ***
(0.161) (0.158) (0.158) (0.164) (0.071) (0.074)
ln Assets 0.288 *** 0.201 *** 0.307 *** 0.216 *** 0.122 *** 0.123 ***
(0.048) (0.035) (0.051) (0.038) (0.014) (0.017)
Bank Control Variables
Npl 0.293 0.292 0.355 0.319 9.210 9.649 *
(0.293) (0.261) (0.314) (0.285) (5.616) (5.778)
RegCap 0.001 -0.141 0.006 -0.124 0.009 0.017
(0.010) (0.261) (0.282) (0.270) (0.038) (0.039)
Mortg/Loans -0.572 -0.428 -0.645 -0.478 -0.131 -0.143
(0.417) (0.393) (0.439) (0.416) (0.128) (0.137)
No. of Observations
(3) (4)(1) (2) (5)
195 1369 1369
(6)
1(Securitized 99-06) 1(Securitized 99-02) Panel Estimation
202 202195
Note. (1), (2)= The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the bank has securitized at least once between 1999 and 
2006 and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables refer to the value in 1999. (3), (4)=The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if 
the bank has securitized at least once between 1999 and 2002 and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables refer to the value in 1999. 
(5), (6)=The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the bank has securitized in year t and zero otherwise; the estimation includes the 
time-dummy variables. The explanatory variables refer to the value in t-1 . The robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the 
firm and bank level are in parentheses. Symbols: p<0.01 = ***, p<0.05 = **, p<0.1 = *. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Tobit estimation of the amount securitized 
 
Financial Cost Proxies
Dep/Loans -0.056 -0.014 -0.024 -0.010 -0.016 ** -0.011 **
(0.069) (0.016) (0.025) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005)
Interbank/ Loans -0.437 *** -0.166 ** -0.052 *
(0.142) (0.084) (0.028)
Debt / Loans -0.171 -0.062 -0.023
(0.475) (0.367) (0.036)
Equity / Loans -0.844 ** -0.589 * 0.078
(0.414) (0.317) (0.136)
Concentration -0.060 -0.113 -0.009
(0.099) (0.077) (0.022)
Liquidity Proxies
Past Profitability / Loans 0.979 -0.649 1.541 0.097 -0.192 -0.016
(3.627) (2.496) (2.801) (1.936) (0.332) (0.365)
Liquidity / Loans -0.209 -0.323 ** -0.112 -0.164 -0.141 ** -0.138 ***
(0.258) (0.143) (0.149) (0.103) (0.055) (0.042)
Growth Proxies
Projected Loan Growth 10.091 ** 8.964 ** 7.187 ** 6.620 * 1.015 *** 0.978 ***
(4.294) (4.437) (3.506) (3.540) (0.372) (0.370)
Access to Markets
Savings 0.062 ** 0.110 *** 0.057 ** 0.066 ** 0.038 *** 0.045 ***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026) (0.009) (0.010)
Coop 0.032 0.106 *** 0.022 0.057 ** 0.012 0.023
(0.035) (0.035) (0.027) (0.023) (0.014) (0.014)
ln Assets 0.029 *** 0.039 *** 0.025 *** 0.027 *** 0.017 *** 0.016 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Bank Control Variables
Npl 0.158 0.164 0.158 0.152 3.176 3.172
(0.137) (0.142) (0.115) (0.113) (1.930) (1.952)
RegCap -0.079 -0.091 -0.020 -0.017 0.006 0.004
(0.084) (0.082) (0.062) (0.062) (0.007) (0.008)
Mortg/Loans 0.050 0.065 -0.004 0.001 -0.015 -0.018
(0.079) (0.089) (0.074) (0.071) (0.029) (0.031)
No. of Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(Securitized 99-06) 1(Securitized 99-02) Panel Estimation
195 195 202 202 1369 1369
Note. (1), (2)= The dependent variable is the ratio of the amount securitized during the period 1999-2006 with respect to assets in 2006 if 
the bank has securitized and zero otherwise. All of the estimations are robust to heteroskedasticity, and the standard errors are clustered 
at the bank level. The explanatory variables refer to the value in 1999. (3), (4)= The dependent variable is the ratio of the amount 
securitized during the period 1999-2002 with respect to assets in 2002 if the bank has securitized and zero otherwise. The explanatory 
variables refer to the value in 1999. (5), (6)=The dependent variable is the amount securitized in year t with respect to assets in t and zero 
otherwise; the estimation includes the time-dummy variables. The explanatory variables refer to the value in t-1. The robust standard 
errors corrected for clustering at the firm and bank level are in parentheses. Symbols: p<0.01 = ***, p<0.05=**, p<0.1 = *. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Duration Model: Number of years from 1998 to securitization  
 
Financial Cost Proxies
Dep/Loans 0.994 * 0.996 0.994 * 0.996
(-1.68) (-1.46) (-1.75) (-1.44)
Interbank/ Loans 0.983 0.980
(-1.41) (-1.62)
Debt / Loans 1.005 1.000
(0.23) (-0.01)
Equity / Loans 0.985 0.965
(-0.38) (-0.84)
Concentration 0.989 0.984 *
(-1.19) (-1.81)
Liquidity Proxies
Past Profitability / Loans 0.995 1.006 0.999 0.985
(-0.05) (0.07) (-0.01) (-0.15)
Liquidity / Loans 1.009 1.007 1.011 1.009801
(0.90) (0.75) (1.16) (1.03)
Growth Proxies
Projected Loan Growth 1.785 *** 1.710 *** 1.928 *** 1.833 ***
(4.09) (3.84) (4.35) (4.09)
Access to Markets
Savings 2.865 *** 3.123 *** 3.987 *** 4.635 ***
(2.90) (3.18) (3.48) (3.90)
Coop 3.073 *** 4.011 *** 3.834 *** 5.356 ***
(3.07) (4.07) (3.56) (4.75)
ln Assets 1.596 *** 1.574 *** 1.819 *** 1.778 ***
(5.62) (5.54) (6.69) (6.50)
Bank Control Variables
Npl 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.997
(-0.50) (-0.50) (-0.68) (-0.78)
RegCap 1.643 1.855 1.298 1.787
(1.10) (1.48) (0.55) (1.33)
Mortg/Loans 1.008 1.009 1.009 1.010
(0.85) (0.98) (0.94) (1.00)
p 1.903 *** 1.912 ***
No. of Observations 211
(4)
WeibullExponential
211 211 211
(1) (2) (3)
 
Note. (1), (2) = The exponential model, hazard rate is constant over time (3), (4)= Weibull 
model, hazard rate is monotonic if p≠1. Symbols: p<0.01 = ***, p<0.05 = **, p< 0.1 = *. The 
results are presented in the form of exponential coefficients, that is, 
βˆe  because they can 
be directly interpreted as the increases in the baseline hazard rate. t-ratios in parentheses. 
 
  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1506 
Table 7.Estimation of the Pecking order Equation 
 
FD 0.560 *** 0.571 *** 0.559 *** 0.573 ***
(0.063) (0.105) (0.064) (0.107)
FD ·Savings -0.025 -0.031
(0.133) (0.136)
FD ·Coop 0.216 ** 0.214 **
(0.106) (0.108)
FD ·Small 0.260 *** -0.263
(0.092) (0.285)
FD ·Savings·Small 0.528 *
(0.309)
FD ·Coop·Small -0.113
(0.394)
Savings 124,249 * 162,538 *
(65,645) (90,510)
Coop 34,257 44,864
(35,324) (46,704)
Small -23,701 44,917
(27,768) (46,696)
Savings·Small -159,200 *
(90,750)
Coop·Small -45,328
(46,714)
Intercept -34,353 22,613 -44,764
(35,311) (27,740) (46,687)
R 2
No. of Observ
Dependent variable: SEC t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
85.04 85.38 85.05 85.48
813 813 813 813  
 
Note. SEC is the volume of securitized assets issued by a bank at t, and FD is the financial deficit of the bank 
defined in [1]; Small is a dummy variable that identifies banks with assets below the 30th percentile of the asset 
distribution of banks of the same legal nature; Savings and Coop are dummy variables that identify the savings 
banks and credit cooperatives, respectively. OLS are estimations with the standard errors clustered at the bank 
level. Symbols: p<0.01 = ***, p<0.05 = **, p<0.1 = *. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of Banks’ Capital Structure 
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 Note. The plot ASSETS displays the relative weights of LOANS, GOV BONDS, INTERBANK and REST with respect to total 
bank assets. The plot LIABILITIES displays the relative weights of SEC, OWN FUNDS, DEBT and DEPOSITS with respect 
to total bank liabilities. 
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Figure 2. Evolution of Banks’ Capital Structure. 
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2B. Banks that do not securitize 
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 Note. The plot ASSETS displays the relative weights of LOANS, GOV BONDS, INTERBANK and REST with respect to total 
bank assets. The plot LIABILITIES displays the relative weights of SEC, OWN FUNDS, DEBT and DEPOSITS with respect 
to total bank liabilities. 
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Figure 3. Evolution of growth rates of loans and deposits. 
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Figure 4. Density of the prediction of the number of years until securitization 
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APPENDIX. Homogenization of the concepts in the variables LOANS and DEPOSITS 
This paper gathers different items of the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet in the 
following aggregate concepts: 
Assets = Loans + Net Interbank + Government Debt + Others (net) 
Liabilities = Own Funds + Securitization + Deposits + Debt 
Most of the items (net interbank, government debt, own funds, debt, securitization) 
are obtained directly from the information in the balance sheet. However, loans and deposits 
require certain adjustments. 
For loans, adjustments are made to address a regulatory change introduced at the 
end of 2004 (CBE 4/2004). Prior to 2004, CBE 4/1991 established that securitized loans were 
to be written off the balance sheets of banks. With the new regulation in CBE 4/2004, banks 
could only write off a securitized loan if securitization implied an effective transfer of the risk of 
that loan. Additionally, the new regulation introduced in 2004 had a retroactive effect, and it 
obliged banks to include again in their balance sheets those loans securitized in the past that 
did not comply with the new criteria of risk transfer. As a consequence, there was a break in 
the series of outstanding loans in year 2005, with approximately 90% of the securitized loans 
made in the past returning to banks’ balance sheets. In order to homogenize these series, we 
adopt the criterion of the CBE 4/2004. We compute the percentage of off-balance sheet 
loans that returns to balance sheets in 2005 and extend this percentage to the previous years 
of the sample (1999-2004). Therefore, the variable LOAN will be equal to the accounting item 
for total loans from 2005 onwards. LOAN will include both total loans in the balance sheet 
and the computed proportion of securitized assets before that year.  
For deposits, Spanish accounting regulation establishes that the liability counterparty 
of an operation of securitization is accounted for in the deposit item of the balance sheet. 
However, we consider a more refined definition of deposits (i.e., funds collected from 
consumers in the retail business of banks) and separate them from securitization. To 
accomplish this, we define DEPOSITS as the difference between the deposit item of the 
balance sheet and the outstanding amount of securitized assets SEC. 
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